SEATTLE DAY NURSERY: FILLING THE NEEDS OF CHILDREN AT RISK (A)

Introduction

During the preceding decade, Executive Director Pat Gogerty had rescued Seattle Day Nursery (SDN) from financial ruin, reorganized the staff, and generated several new programs, expanding the nonprofit organization's scope of service. By 1982, Gogerty had reached a critical crossroads: whether to push state legislators and executives of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) to institutionalize therapeutic child care, or to avoid the restrictions government funding would impose by remaining a privately funded non-profit and continuing the program on its own. SDN had pioneered therapeutic child care (TCC) to treat the youngest abused and neglected children. If DSHS were to incorporate TCC into its existing menu of services, the state could contract with agencies like Seattle Day Nursery to deliver the program, but the nonprofits would have to operate by the rules that came with the money.

Funded initially by a “development and demonstration” grant from United Way of King County, SDN's innovative TCC program was showing positive results at the end of a two-year, state-funded study. Of the 60 children involved in the study, those who had received therapeutic child care at SDN were better behaved than those in the control group, and parents of the treatment group children had a more positive outlook about their offspring. The study also suggested that removing a child from the home every day provided a respite for the parent(s), enrichment for the child, and stability for the family.

The state's endorsement of the program would likely be funded by federal dollars that required parents to participate in current programs prescribed by state-level child protection agencies. This restriction troubled Gogerty, who had deliberately designed TCC to put the safety of the
child ahead of the “sanctity” of the family. Establishing a formal relationship with DSHS might be risky business for the 80-year-old nonprofit organization, which had been fairly autonomous up to this point.

The First Day Care Center in the West

Seattle Day Nursery was founded as a charitable organization in 1909 to provide day care for the parishioners of the First Presbyterian Church. At that time, the need for day care was on the rise, because more and more women were working as a result of their husbands’ dying, suffering work-related injuries, or abandoning them. Within three years, SDN had moved out of the church and into a larger building on Capitol Hill. By the early 1920s, SDN counted nearly 500 members, who financed construction of the first building west of the Mississippi River to be used exclusively for child care.

SDN's favorable position in the community was affirmed when it became a charter member of United Way of King County in 1921. Its first United Way allocation amounted to $5,872, nearly half of the agency’s total budget, which supported further expansion of day care. In addition to United Way revenue, SDN received both financial and in-kind contributions from the community. These donations supported the work of women volunteers, known as “matrons,” under the direction of a Head Matron.

In 1960, at the urging of United Way, SDN hired its first professional executive director. Mildred Reed, a social worker, was charged with decreasing SDN’s dependence on United Way, which provided $81,654 (74.5 percent of SDN’s total budget) that year. The Johnson Administration's Great Society initiatives, specifically the new Head Start program, provided Reed with a golden opportunity. To tap this new funding source, Seattle Day Nursery teamed up with another local nonprofit, Neighborhood House, to implement a Head Start day care program for low-income families. The three-classroom St. James Head Start Center and the Day Care Home Program, which was operated by mothers in 10 homes in four housing projects, provided health services, nutrition, education, social and psychological services, and opportunities for parent involvement. Before long, SDN was receiving nearly $100,000 annually from the federal government to support the Head Start programs.

Poor fiscal management, however, undermined Reed's programmatic initiatives. In 1971, she began to tap the organization's “Trust Fund,” a reserve supported by individual donations, to balance the books. SDN's Board grew nervous and pressured Reed to balance the budget without draining this account. Reed herself became increasingly immersed in several social work initiatives under way at the national level. United Way cut its annual allocation by 4 percent, and an unidentified staff member stole several thousand dollars from one of SDN's branches. From September to December of 1972, Reed used up her vacation and sick leave and then quietly resigned from her post.

A New Director with a New Direction
Richard Nixon's landslide Presidential victory in November 1972 exacerbated the SDN Board's concern that its primary funding sources were in jeopardy. Nixon had run on a platform of dismantling most federal programs for the working poor, such as Head Start. The Board was determined to hire a new director who possessed a combination of administrative and leadership skills, someone who would closely manage the agency's programs, staff, and budget. With nearly 20 years experience working in public service, specifically in government and nonprofit child welfare agencies, Patrick L. Gogerty was selected from a pool of a dozen candidates.

When the 43-year-old Gogerty arrived at SDN on April 1, 1973, the Board gave him a two-pronged mandate. He was asked to: 1) make the organization more cost effective, even if that meant cutting back services and staff, and 2) look at new ways in which the organization could serve the community. “The Board told me to examine the agency's three branches and determine which one could be shut down,” Gogerty remembers. “They also wanted me to look at how the day care programs could be more relevant to the community, particularly young children.”

Gogerty inherited a $353,810 budget and 31 paid staff in three branches, which offered developmental child care programs with an emphasis on education. Children in these programs ranged in age from two to six years; all had to be toilet trained before entering the program, which precluded infants from participating. The staff was a mix of young and old; some had worked with SDN for nearly 20 years. While United Way still contributed a large share of SDN's budget, its share of the overall budget had fallen to 43 percent in 1973, from an all-time high of 75 percent in 1960. The grass-roots Board of Trustees was composed of one-half “wealthy women,” one-third clients, a parent representative, a psychiatric nurse, and representatives from each SDN branch.

**Evaluating SDN's Existing Staff and Services**

Gogerty tackled the organizational effectiveness mandate first, but he was not convinced that he would have to shut down one of SDN's three branches. “I reviewed budget expenditures line by line,” he recalls. “I asked supervisors to evaluate the performance of their staff, then I evaluated the supervisory staff.” Immediately, Gogerty observed that Seattle Day Nursery's culture encouraged dependency among its clients. “Case managers focused on crisis intervention rather than prevention,” he explains. “For example, two social workers on staff were vocal about their belief that people had a right to be subsidized in order to realize their goals.” This philosophy differed sharply from Gogerty's vision of services that would encourage independence and responsibility.

In the course of his eight-month, agency-wide evaluation, Gogerty also visited each of the agency's three branches: the Main Branch at Broadway and Boren, the John Wilson Branch on Capitol Hill, and the Holly Park Branch in South Seattle. He found evidence of dysfunction
when he visited the John Wilson Branch one morning in July. “It was chaos,” he remembers, “There were 20 kids in each of the three rooms. The staff was at war with each other, yelling obscenities from room to room. At the end of the hall, the branch supervisor's door was closed.” When Gogerty confronted the supervisor about her staff's behavior, she responded, “Oh, they do that a lot.”

Incensed by her apparent indifference to staff infighting, and the unquestionable impact the yelling and swearing would have on the children in day care, Gogerty decided to transfer her to SDN's Main Branch, which neighbored the administrative offices. In turn, he charged the current Main Branch supervisor with getting the staff back on track at John Wilson. This would be the easiest and quickest solution, he thought. The transferred supervisor was upset with Gogerty's decision, however, and her staff quickly organized a petition to rescind the transfer. Every parent of every child in the John Wilson Branch signed the petition, which the staff took directly to the Board. Just four months into the job, Gogerty sensed that trouble was brewing.

Startled by the petition, the Board called an emergency meeting on a hot summer evening the next week. “She (the transferred supervisor) had the entire social work staff behind her,” Gogerty recalls. For several hours Board members heard from parents, staff, and, finally, Gogerty. He described what he had witnessed and defended his decision. One staffer suggested that Gogerty's work experience in juvenile rehabilitation would inspire him to run SDN like a prison. This, she told the Board, would be the first of many decisions Gogerty made without consulting with staff.

A few days later, on a Sunday afternoon, the Board's Executive Committee called in Gogerty, who immediately took charge of the meeting. “If you cannot support this transfer, you'll have to find someone else, because I won't be able to manage this staff,” he said. If the Board supported the staff petition, Gogerty would have no basis for decision-making authority in the future. On the other hand, if the Board supported Gogerty's decision, repercussions from the staff might be severe. Moments later the Board voted by a small margin to support the transfer. Surprisingly, staff fallout was limited to Gogerty's most vocal critic, who eventually resigned to work for another agency. Other staffing changes during Gogerty's evaluation of the agency included the resignation of two key employees, one who had expected to be promoted to Executive Director, and the addition of a part-time social worker for each of the three branches.

**Responding to the Second Mandate: New Services for the Community**

With the organization's existing programs and staffing stabilized by the end of the 1973, Gogerty turned his attention to the second part of the SDN Board's mandate, new ways of serving the community and soliciting financial support. The organization's pre-school day care program and related services for low-income families were justified by a steady flow of 60 or so children and related federal funding that was somewhat secure thanks to the Watergate scandal, which seriously undermined President Nixon's proposals for cutting public programs that served the poor.
As he began to examine ways in which SDN could add value to the landscape of children's services, one of his Board members approached him about a dilemma she faced. “Both my husband and I work,” she explained, “Which means our kids are alone after school until we get home at night.” Gogerty knew this was an issue many working parents faced, and he thought a program that extended the notion of day care to older children would fit nicely with SDN’s mission. He went about establishing the Latch Key Program, Seattle’s first after-school program. With every cent in the budget already accounted for, Gogerty knew that the program had to be self-sustaining. He negotiated with Seward School to donate space, and SDN charged a sliding-scale fee to provide a safe, supervised environment for children from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. each day. The program became so popular that soon it was replicated in two schools in the south end of Seattle, and was eventually turned over to the Seattle School District.

Meanwhile, Gogerty learned that Congress had passed an amendment to the Social Services Act, establishing Title 20, a program of grants to states to prevent abuse and neglect, serve families, and reduce inappropriate institutional care by providing community and home-based care. Ironically, many of the people operating the home-based day care centers could not seek this training because of the nature of their work: they needed to be home during the day. As a day-care operator, Gogerty recognized this restriction and wanted to devise a service that would train home-based day care workers in the home. Several Board members, however, were not convinced that such a program was necessary, or that it justified the time Gogerty and his staff would need to develop and fund it. One Board member, in fact, conducted an informal survey of day care providers to prove that Gogerty's instincts were wrong.

Despite such tactics, the Board approved, by a margin of one vote, Gogerty's proposal to establish the Early Education Mobile Resource Program (EEMRP), which would transport education specialists to caregivers throughout the city and surrounding suburban and rural areas to enhance the caregivers' skills. When SDN's Title 20 grant proposal was approved later that year, Gogerty purchased three vans and began sending staff to home-based day care centers in low-income census tracts in Seattle's Central Area, South Pierce County, and North Snohomish County. These “workshops on wheels” disseminated information and provided educational materials, books, and art supplies. As a result, SDN built and strengthened relations with the wider child care community. At the end of the program's first year, 92 percent of the caregivers who had been visited by EEMRP staff said their job had been made easier as a result.

**Rising Awareness of Child Abuse and Neglect**

With two new programs up and running by the end of 1976, Gogerty re-examined SDN’s core constituency: young children from low-income families. On a regular basis, Gogerty and his staff saw children in their day care programs who exhibited signs of physical abuse and neglect. “It seemed natural for us to try to address this problem among our children in some way,” he recalls. Gogerty's awareness of, and concern about, child abuse was fueled by his work experience with juvenile delinquents (many of whom, he observed, had been abused or
neglected earlier in life) in the 1950s and '60s, and by reading The Battered Child, a collection of research published in 1962 that suggested child abuse and neglect was a societal syndrome that would often result in violence and crime later in life. As one article stated, “The medical, social, pathological, psychiatric and legal contributions [in this collection] began to bring into perspective the multidisciplinary aspects of this serious problem.”

As Gogerty's own awareness of child abuse and neglect grew, so did that of the public. Governments at every level began to respond by passing first-ever child protection legislation. Until the Washington State legislature passed its first measure to protect children in 1965, children were not specifically protected from harm except under broad and often questionable interpretations of statutes prohibiting cruelty to animals. In 1974, Congress had passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, which created the National Center for Child Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN) and provided federal funds to help states in develop programs to identify, prevent, and rectify child abuse and neglect.

In Washington State, the Department of Social and Health Services developed and administered services for abused and neglected children and their families were. Upon receiving a report of child abuse or neglect, Child Protective Services (CPS) would screen the situation against the legal definition of child abuse and look for signs indicating whether the child was at imminent risk of abuse or neglect. In developing a case plan for the child, CPS was required to weigh the sanctity of the family against the potential danger. The legislative language authorizing CPS instructed case workers to preserve families and protect children from harm. In some cases, this balancing act was a “catch-22,” and parental rights would win out over the rights of a child. Case workers were not encouraged to take precautionary stances in cases of abuse and neglect. Home-based, family-centered programs were less disruptive and less expensive. Only in extreme cases would CPS remove a child from his or her home, even temporarily.

Gogerty believed that a child's safety was paramount, plain and simple. He believed that CPS should err on the side of safety, rather than on the side of preserving the family unit. His frustration with the state's mandate grew when he called looking for a sympathetic ear at CPS in Olympia the state capitol. When he asked if the agency could do more to prevent child abuse and neglect, he recalls that “nobody would deal with anything but the whole family.” Thus, a CPS case plan for an abused or neglected child was useless and meaningless unless the child's parent(s) consented to the recommended treatment. Parental involvement was required by the state legislature, as well as several federal programs that supported some of the state's initiatives. If a parent prevented a child from participating in treatment, the state's only carrot was a broken stick: the threat of removing the child from the home, which was rarely prescribed.

Gogerty's report of what he had learned piqued the SDN Board's interest. At the time, many Board members were women who had worked to put their husbands through college and received public child care support in the process. They were curious about how other cities and states were addressing child abuse and neglect, so they decided to send Gogerty to five cities to
gather more information about such programs. In Denver, St. Louis, Chicago, New York, and Chula Vista, California, he discovered that all programs required parental consent of a child's participation in services. In his opinion, this requirement often disqualified the most needy and often forgotten segment of children in society, those who were too young to speak on their own behalf.

Back in Seattle, Gogerty had the support of enough Board members to continue gathering information about local services – and service gaps – for abused and neglected children. Frustrated by the response he had received from CPS administrators in Olympia, Gogerty decided to approach the Central Unit of CPS in Seattle. He had heard that the Central Unit Supervisor, Dick Westgard, was not afraid to push on children's issues he cared about. He had been with CPS for six years and was encouraged by the regional administrator to experiment with ways to better serve children and families. Realizing that CPS could not help abused children without involving their parents (the abusers, in many cases), Westgard and others had developed a program focused on therapy, nutrition, and education for families. According to Gogerty, the social-work community resisted this scheme because “nobody wanted to work with child abusers.” While this program model was a step in the right direction, Gogerty remained determined to develop an alternative model that did not require parental consent or involvement. Westgard and others working under the state and federal funding umbrellas were simply prohibited from developing or administering such a program.

When Gogerty first called Westgard, he explained that he was thinking about how Seattle Day Nursery could serve abused and neglected young children. Westgard replied that, in fact, he had been thinking about how CPS in south and central Seattle could develop community resources to address the apparent problem of child abuse. At Westgard’s urging, Gogerty met with the Central Unit case managers to discuss the situations their clients faced and the issues and frustrations they faced each day in helping those families. Gogerty asked them to describe their most disturbing and problematic cases. The case workers responded that they were most concerned about the welfare of children under the age of two who were at home alone with their mothers and just out of reach of state programs, most of which were designed to serve children aged five to seventeen. “These parents won't bring in their children [for treatment],” some case workers said, “Even if it's in their case plan.” As a result, many abused and neglected children were unable to take advantage of the services available to them. In addition, Gogerty learned, case workers usually interacted with families and children only during in-home treatment. They rarely had the means to check up on the children and families on a regular basis, apart from scheduled meetings.

Three's A Charm: Seattle Day Nursery Responds

Back in his office, Gogerty tried to sort out what he had learned about child abuse and neglect during the past few months. He was certain that the Seattle community needed more in the way of prevention and treatment services. In addition to identifying an underserved population of children – infants and toddlers – Gogerty saw at least two barriers to delivering or receiving
services: parental consent and transportation. Often, parents would not approve of services, would not participate in a service plan, or would not provide transportation for their children to receive services.

Working with several of his staff, Gogerty began to sketch a program that would build upon SDN's developmental day care expertise and take advantage of SDN's existing resources, such as the EEMRP vans and the Main Branch on Capitol Hill. A recently received grant through the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act would allow SDN to recruit and train unemployed citizens, thereby addressing the organization's staffing needs. Initially, the children served by this program would come from SDN's existing client base – low-income families that showed some signs of abusing and/or neglecting their children – and referrals from CPS and Child Welfare Services. Funding would not accompany the referrals, so SDN could avoid the political and financial strings that came with the territory of the state budget. “These kids were at the bottom of the barrel,” Gogerty recalled, “Their parents were debilitated and were not likely to participate or cooperate in a service plan.” Gogerty and his staff named the program therapeutic child care (TCC) and structured the services as follows:

* child assessment on the Batelle Development Inventory at entry and every six months thereafter,
* three to six hours of child care per day,
* parent skill training,
* parent counseling,
* child transportation to and from the service center, and
* daily monitoring of child welfare.

As determined by the developmental assessments, a child might receive speech or physical therapy. Babies would be held and fed. Gogerty and his staff also believed that transporting children to and from the Main Branch would afford additional protection for the children. “The fact that they are picked up and returned home by two program staff each day is an important deterrent to abuse, because it provides unobtrusive but continuing surveillance of the family,” Gogerty explained. “This is far more effective and efficient than any system of spot checks by overburdened CPS workers.” Since SDN did not wish to alienate parents with these new services, they did not require parents to join their children in treatment. Instead, SDN offered optional parenting support and education.

The following excerpt from a therapeutic child care concept paper prepared by SDN's senior staff describes the perceived need for, and intent of, TCC:

For many of us working with troubled youth in the 1970s and watching with alarm the revolving doors of our ever more crowded correctional and treatment facilities, 90 percent of whose inmates have been abused or neglected as children, the message was clear! We needed to go back to the beginning of the life cycle, not step in later along the way.
The concept of therapeutic child care and treatment signaled a radical departure from the traditional model: it focused primarily on the protection and care of children ages one month to five years, regardless of their parents' desire or ability to be involved. TCC was conceived as a prevention and early intervention program that would be effective in helping to stabilize families, reunify families, or, in extreme cases, convince the parent to voluntarily relinquish their parental rights…

The bottom line about child abuse is that if we don't pay to help these children while they are young, we will pay for it later. Without remedial treatment, abused children often go on to burden the social welfare and criminal justice systems as drug and alcohol abusers, criminals, victims of domestic violence and/or child abusers themselves. In fact, more than 90 percent of the inmates in Washington State prisons were abused as children.

**Developing and Selling a Pilot Program**

With the TCC program designed, Gogerty set out to build support from his Board, CPS, the social work community, and the communities in which SDN's facilities were located. He made numerous presentations to community groups, such as local Rotary Clubs, to dispel any myths or reservations they might have about abused and neglected children and their families receiving care in their midst. Convincing the Board of Trustees that SDN should move in this new direction was a much easier task than Gogerty had imagined. The combination of their early interest, Gogerty's enthusiasm, and the apparent need for the services proposed was contagious. Excited about pioneering a program for the youngest abused and neglected children, the Board endorsed TCC and paved the way for implementation the following year, if Gogerty could secure funds.

In the local social work community, Gogerty sought and received the support of Shirley Anderson, a well respected social worker who had devised a sexual assault service for emergency rooms, often the first point of contact for child abuse victims. Gogerty's cause was also helped by a coincidental media campaign to promote awareness of child abuse and neglect.

With organizational and community support for the new program in hand – and the endorsement of the local CPS unit – Gogerty approached longtime SDN supporter United Way of King County. He proposed to launch TCC as a discrete “demonstration and development project,” and United Way answered with a $12,000 grant. With this money Gogerty established the therapeutic child care program for 10 preschool children, the most he could fit in one of SDN's vans. Again, these children came from SDN's existing client pool, as well as CPS and CWS referrals. Furthermore, without tapping state or federal funds for the program itself, Gogerty could offer his new services regardless of parental involvement. Recognizing TCC's benefits, the SDN Board approved expansion of the program in the following year. Also, the Board adopted a new mission to incorpo-rate its new services: “to break the cycle of
child abuse and to reduce the incidence of abuse and neglect in future generations by providing an early intervention program.”
Next Steps: Public or Private Funding for TCC?

Two years into operation, albeit without any formal performance measurements, TCC seemed to be having a positive effect on the children and families it served. Furthermore, the staff and the Board were mobilized and excited about the program. Gogerty counted fewer and fewer skeptics among SDN’s constituency. He knew that to survive, however, the program needed a dependable funding stream, a larger client base, and a show of significant results in the community.

In the start-up phase, Gogerty had found a way to avoid the political and funding restrictions of parental rights over children’s services. He also realized that he could only serve the larger pool of abused and neglected children through CPS, which received and fielded all reports of abuse and neglect in the state. While he was not particularly optimistic about the prospect of CPS’s officially supporting (and thereby referring children to) TCC, he was aware that the legislature was examining DSHS’s range of children’s services and the extent to which they met existing needs. The state legislative budget committee had recently conducted a performance audit of the adoption program and the state child abuse system. The audit called for a needs assessment process to gather comparable data of children across all DSHS programs.

At this time, the average age of children in the CPS system was 7.5 years. While children under the age of 13 accounted for a majority of the caseload, very young children and infants were rarely captured by the existing system of protective and preventive services. The services available to abused and neglected children and their families were limited to inexpensive home-based treatment and out-of-home placements, which were often disruptive and expensive.

While Gogerty and his staff were excited about the value and importance of the pilot therapeutic child care program begun in 1977, they were highly skeptical of the prospective involvement with state government and the related potential for restrictions harmful to children they wished to protect. At the same time, Seattle Day Nursery’s child care services for working families were no longer unique – other nonprofits had cropped up throughout Seattle in response to federal and state funding opportunities for services to benefit low-income families. But, these agencies were making a pact with the devil, possibly leaving out the kids whose parents wouldn’t cooperate and leaving no choice but to engage parents in ways that might harm their children.

Addressing Child Abuse and Neglect Statewide

In 1979, the Washington State legislature signaled its commitment to stemming the rising tide of child abuse and neglect by passing a mandatory reporting requirement for all child abuse incidents. The legislature also responded to the budget committee audit of children's services by endorsing a four-year research project to assess the needs of children served by DSHS programs. In this political climate, Pat Gogerty initiated a relationship with state government that would forever change both SDN and DSHS. Finally acknowledging that the state could help expand and institutionalize the experimental TCC program, he decided to approach DSHS.
about establishing a mechanism through which Seattle Day Nursery could get referrals (and program reimbursements) from CPS.

To convince state legislators that they should authorize DSHS to contract with nonprofits to provide TCC, Gogerty rallied a strong network of friends and colleagues who had been active in social issues. For example, Pat Thibadeau of Washington Women United, an advocacy group, added SDN's therapeutic child care program to her lobbying agenda. Gogerty also solicited the support of a well-respected colleague in Tacoma and a corporate lobbyist who believed strongly in the cause. In terms of elected officials, Gogerty had an ally in Representative Jim McDermott (D), whom Gogerty had known since the early 1970s when McDermott worked as a child psychiatrist. But Gogerty knew that McDermott was considered too liberal to give Gogerty or his program any significant leverage in the House.

Unwilling to call on McDermott for help, Gogerty contacted Vito Chiechi, the Republican Chief Clerk of the House (during this session there was both a Democrat and a Republican Chief Clerk because the house membership was split 49 - 49). The two had become acquainted a few years earlier when they worked together on Wes Uhlman's campaign against current governor Dixy Lee Ray. Furthermore, Gogerty's brother Bob had been Uhlman's deputy when he was Mayor of Seattle. At the same time, Gogerty got in touch with Senate Majority Leader Gordy Walgren (D). Walgren and Chiechi, in turn, introduced Gogerty to State Representatives Joan Haucher (R) and Audrey Gruger (D). Before he knew it, Gogerty's therapeutic child care program had support to move forward.

Several days hence, Gogerty sat in Rep. Gruger's office and wrote the “statement of work” – replicating the program he and his staff had designed two years prior – for a two-year, $250,000 therapeutic child care demonstration project and paired it with a study of the appropriateness of treating abused children in day care facilities. HB 1207 was ushered through the House and Senate by Chiechi and Walgren and signed by Governor Ray. Almost immediately, 32 infants and toddlers were referred at random to Seattle Day Nursery through CPS’s assessment process. The ratio of professional staff to children was three to one. To complete the study group, CPS referred an additional 29 children to its standard array of services over an 18-month period. Children in imminent danger from harm were excluded from the study.

As described in a 1981 article co-authored by Gogerty and Dr. Roderick Durkin, the primary goal of therapeutic child care is to provide early intervention for abused and neglected children in order to reduce the effects of maltreatment. (See Appendix I: Excerpts.) The article also suggested that a day care center like SDN is more likely to be trusted by parents and regarded as a source of help, because it is relatively free from the stigma attached to other organizations and facilities. That same year, the final report of the DSHS children's services needs assessment stated that the most common barrier to service delivery was refusal of the child’s family to accept services.
Signs of Success

At the end of the two-year study, the results were clear: children who received SDN’s services were better behaved, and their parents had a more positive outlook. In more general terms, the study found that removing a child from the home on a daily basis provided a respite for the parent(s), enrichment for the child, and stability for the family.

With this data in hand, Gogerty turned his thoughts to institutionalizing TCC services over the long term. While the funding for the two-year study had further diversified SDN’s funding (see Appendix 2: Budget History), and he had developed a positive relationship with CPS, Gogerty still faced several obstacles. A supportive financial liaison in the agency suggested to Gogerty that he needed to think bigger than his own agency’s needs if he wanted to get the legislature’s support. “SDN can’t be the only organization providing these services,” she said. Given the specialized nature of TCC, Gogerty did not fear that the state’s endorsement and funding would result in a proliferation of new programs that would thereby compete with Seattle Day Nursery for contracting dollars. Potentially, in fact, TCC might expand its impact across the state. He did fear, however, that if the legislature added TCC to DSHS’s continuum of services, funding with federal dollars—the only apparent source available—would require parental approval and involvement. SDN’s engagement with the state might then force SDN and TCC away from the very children who needed them most.

He wondered how he could build a strategy, with help from the more sophisticated and connected Board he had recruited, for private fund raising and referral to preserve the agency’s freedom and policy independence and ensure access to protection for the most vulnerable children. At the same time, he had to consider the ethics and mission impact of continuing to build on the political connections of his Board.
Appendix 1

Excerpts from “Help the Child First: The Seattle Day Nursery/Childhaven Approach” (1981) by Patrick L. Gogerty and Dr. Roderick Durkin

* Therapeutic Child Care encourages but does not require parental participation.
* The primary goal of the program is to provide early intervention in the lives of abused and neglected children in order to reduce the long-term harmful effects caused by maltreatment.
* Of the 10,000 abused children supervised by CPS, the most difficult group to reach and treat are children under two years of age.
* A day care program uniquely furnishes an opportunity for regular surveillance of the family and can provide important information about the risks to the child of remaining with the parents. A day care center is more likely to be trusted by parents and regarded as a source of help; it is relatively free from stigma attached to other organizations and facilities.
* Existing self-contained programs for the population have been limited in their widespread applicability.

In more general terms, Gogerty and Durkin also explained that the child abuse care and treatment program conducted by SDN was designed to:

* Develop and implement a model for reorganizing community resources to create a comprehensive program for the protection, care, and treatment of abused and neglected children;
* Develop and refine treatment strategies tailored to the needs of young children and their families; and
* Assess the impact of treatment and the effectiveness of the program with an ongoing process of evaluation that will also furnish basic knowledge about the causes and effects of child abuse.

Child care and treatment services were designed to:

* Assist child in acquiring age-appropriate development competencies such as language and fine motor skills;
* Facilitate the development of autonomy and positive self-image;
* Facilitate the development of positive interactions with adults and with peers; and
* Reduce the potential for parental abuse and neglect through the reduction of problematic behaviors.
# Appendix 2

## Seattle Day Nursery/Childhaven Budget History (1921-1982)

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>United Way Allocation</th>
<th>State Funding For TCC</th>
<th>Other Sources (pub. &amp; priv.)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>$81,654</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>$27,551</td>
<td>$109,205*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>$157,339</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>$6,643</td>
<td>$363,810*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>$186,779</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>$6,300</td>
<td>$193,079*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>$197,279</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>$7,300</td>
<td>$204,579*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>$213,845</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>$31,904</td>
<td>$245,749*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>$227,745</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>$27,888</td>
<td>$255,633*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$249,132</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>$10,944</td>
<td>$260,076*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>$287,571</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>$12,037</td>
<td>$299,608*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$336,712</td>
<td>$125,000</td>
<td>$46,386</td>
<td>$508,098*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>$367,016</td>
<td>$125,000</td>
<td>$74,945</td>
<td>$566,961*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>$409,011</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>$32,358</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates an estimated figure

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(1) SDN becomes charter member of United Way of King County.
(2) SDN hires first “professional” executive director, Mildred Reed.
(3) SDN names Patrick Gogerty executive director.
(4) SDN launches pilot therapeutic child care program with 10 children.